Russian President Vladimir Putin has not demonstrated any discernible change over the last few weeks in his maximalist stance on how to end his war in Ukraine.
Viktor Orban in Kyiv, Ukraine, on July 2, 2024 Photo: Maxym Marusenko/NurPhoto via Getty Images.
Nevertheless, many other governments and organizations continue to propose ideas and initiatives for how to end this devastating conflict, though not all of these are conducive to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s proposal for organizing the second peace summit this November (Kommersant, July 17). Some pleas for an immediate ceasefire, like the letter from a group of Nobel Prize laureates calling for peace in both Ukraine and Gaza, come from sincere humanitarian concerns (Novaya gazeta, July 13). Other maneuvers are less magnanimous and more self-serving.
Still, Moscow is keen to channel every proposition toward its obsessive goal of eroding Western unity and undermining the pro-Ukraine coalition.
Hungary and Russian intrigues
Hungary’s contrarian prime minister, Viktor Orban, has sought to capitalize on the search for peace and has made himself a key conduit for Russian intrigues. Abusing his new position of EU Council President, he has made trips to Kyiv, Moscow, and Beijing and then presented proposals for ending the war (Forbes.ru, July 15). In the newly-elected European Parliament, 495 of the 720 members recently condemned this “peace” mission as a breach of standard policy (Meduza, July 17). Orban insists that his initiative is on track and further confidential steps are being prepared (RBC, July 18). Putin, however, has not hinted at any possible decrease in Russian demands, but commentators in Moscow still praised Orban’s stance (Russia in Global Affairs, July 17).
Hungary’s distinct position on the war in Ukraine may be convenient for Russia, but the consolidated position of the European Union in support of Ukraine is only getting stronger. The re-election of Ursula von der Leyen as the President of the European Commission signifies a broad commitment to increasing the EU security profile necessary for prevailing in confrontation with Russia (Kommersant, July 18). Her intention to appoint a commissioner for defense cooperation is interpreted in Moscow as a step toward transforming the European Union into a military alliance (Izvestiya, July 18).
The role of Kaja Kallas
The European Union’s resolve to deter Russian aggression is also confirmed by the promotion of Kaja Kallas, the former prime minister of Estonia and fierce critic of Putin’s regime, to the position of High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (Novaya gazeta Europe, July 18).
Kallas’ appointment shows that the firm stance of the “frontline states,” such as Estonia and Poland, is shared and reinforced by Northern Europe, where pacifist opinions and movements used to be prevalent (The Moscow Times, July 17). Broad support for denying Russia any gains from its aggression was also demonstrated at the European Political Community Summit hosted in the United Kingdom last week (Kommersant, July 18). Zelenskyy used the opportunity to speak at Blenheim Palace — Winston Churchill’s ancestral home — to invoke the former British prime minister’s example of leadership in resisting and defeating arrogant tyranny and to request more help for Ukraine’s defiant fight (Lenta, July 18). Russian commentators have given no convincing response to this show of solidarity, instead resorting to looking for evidence of Germany’s inability to take a lead in forging European unity (Nezavisimaya gazeta, July 15).
NATO and US leadership
What confuses pundits in Moscow is that European security dynamics are not compelled by US pressure but rather stem from motivations internal to their own organizations and governments (Rossiiskaya gazeta, July 16). US leadership in the path to peace remains crucial, as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) summit demonstrated yet again. However, Russian propaganda’s standard rhetoric about US dominance does not apply in the case of EU decision making (Re: Russia, July 12; see EDM, July 15, 17, 18).
Whatever twists and turns US domestic politics makes in the months leading up to the November presidential election, Putin will not get his wish for Ukraine’s capitulation (Svoboda.org, July 18).
The US prioritizing China
Another certainty is that the next US administration will prioritize managing strategic competition with China. Beijing responded angrily to the assertion in the declaration of the Washington Summit that China was the primary “enabler” of Russian aggression and has expressed disapproval of the expansion of NATO activities in the Indo-Pacific (Vedomosti, July 12; TopWar.ru, July 19). Besides the predictable denials and condemnations, Beijing finds it essential to confirm its commitment to ending the war in Ukraine, which does not rule out its participation in the second peace summit (RBC, July 16).
Instead of elaborating on its old “peace plan,” China has suggested signing an agreement committing the five permanent members of the UN Security Council not to threaten or plan a first nuclear strike, implicitly undercutting Putin’s pattern of brinkmanship (Kommersant, July 18). At the same time, however, it should be noted that China has also pulled out of nuclear arms control talks with the United States in recent weeks (TASS, July 17). Chinese President Xi Jinping granted Orban an audience but did not encourage his mediation for peace, perhaps preferring to communicate with the EU leadership on this issue without this dubious interlocutor (Izvestiya, July 8).
Moscow still hopes that an escalation of tensions between China and the West could make its key strategic partner more supportive of its war (RIA Novosti, July 20). What makes Beijing’s diplomatic maneuvering hard to comprehend for the Kremlin is the scope of China’s economic problems due to pressure from Western countries, which determines the political priorities of its leadership (RIAC, July 19). Russia relies on China for the livelihood of its military-industrial complex, as China is one of the few states that will trade essential parts with Russia due to Western sanctions, meaning Russia has tied its economy closer to China’s (see EDM, January 22, April 29, May 6, 14).
Promoting a constructive peace process
For many key external stakeholders, it is relatively clear that the current deadlock in trench warfare is not conducive to promoting a constructive peace process. Russia is prepared to keep wasting a thousand soldiers a day for the control of a notional “strategic initiative,” and Ukraine hopes that its resilience will grant it a stronger negotiation position, perhaps by as soon as the end of the year (see EDM, July 16). In the abstract, the proposition of bringing the war to an end through peace talks is nevertheless increasing in popularity on both sides, which have been traumatized by this protracted disaster.
This preference has not yet translated into a readiness to compromise, which opens space for self-serving politicians to declare “peace” slogans without putting any substance into them (see EDM, July 2). Willingly or not, they play into Putin’s hands, which are locked on the levers of his war machine. He is firmly set on dividing the West and ruling Ukraine, and the hard road to peace proceeds from denying this ambition to its ultimate defeat.
- Pavel K Baev is a Research Professor at PRIO
- This text is also published by Eurasia Daily Monitor