China presents itself as a different kind of development actor compared to Western donors — more equal and with less imposition and interference in national affairs, based on the belief that economic development leads to peace. However, many doubt this is the case. A look at Pakistan shows that local conditions and conflicts challenge this neutrality.
Pakistani soldiers and Chinese staff during the opening of a trade project in Gwadar port, west of Karachi in 2016. This port was a key part of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Photo: Metin Aktas/Anadolu Agency/Getty Images
Two contrasting images of China emerge: one of an aggressive superpower, allied with Russia and preparing for war, posing a threat to the world and NATO, and another as a peaceful actor supporting economic development and cooperation through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
China emphasizes that supporting economic development and trade cooperation with developing countries, without interfering in their internal affairs, is the best recipe for peacebuilding. Scholars refer to this as “development peace” – achieving peace through development.
Yet, skepticism remains. Some argue that China provides more loans than aid, while others are skeptical that China does not expect returns or support for its geopolitical and military positioning. Examples include the failed development of the Hambantota port in Sri Lanka, which China eventually bought from the Sri Lankan state, the extensive use of Chinese workers rather than hiring locals, and concerns that the Belt and Road projects are not environmentally friendly and may increase the debt burden of developing countries.
There are also worries that China prioritizes state stability over promoting human rights and democracy.
Research initiatives
Much attention and research have focused on China’s growing role and influence in Africa. However, a recent research project at the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) and Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI) looks at perceptions of China as a development actor in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and whether these efforts can contribute to peace in countries with varying degrees of conflict and governance systems.
Early findings suggest that China’s portrayal as a neutral development driver needs to be nuanced, as internal and regional conflicts and power dynamics challenge its neutrality. The first phase of the research focuses on Pakistan, where the construction of the Gwadar port in the poor Balochistan province, part of the extensive China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) project, has garnered significant attention.
A long-lasting brotherhood
Much of the literature and many interviews emphasize the long, brotherly relationship between China and Pakistan. Pakistan was one of the first countries to recognize the People’s Republic of China in 1950. With India as a common adversary, the two countries have politically supported each other, as in the Kashmir conflict. They have also refrained from criticizing issues in each other’s countries, such as China’s treatment of the Uyghur Muslim minority.
One of the early joint projects was the construction of the year-round Karakoram Highway, which opened in 1978. Since then, China has provided extensive financial aid to Pakistan. There is also collaboration on nuclear energy and weapons, with China being Pakistan’s largest arms supplier. Academic and educational cooperation has increased, though the large language barriers have limited its potential.
The nature of Pakistan’s governance, whether democratic or under military rule, seems to have little impact on the relationship. It has continued under both democratically elected governments and long periods of military rule. Many observers note that the military in Pakistan exercises significant influence over national politics and has taken an increasingly active role in the economy through ownership and management of private firms, including parts of the CPEC project.
Challenging balancing act
While Pakistan has maintained its cooperation with China, it has also tried to sustain relations with former colonial power Britain and, especially, the U.S., which has provided both financial and military aid. Cooperation was strong during the Cold War, following the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan, and was revived during the War on Terror.
However, skepticism towards Pakistan grew in the U.S. after it was revealed that Al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden had been hiding near a Pakistani military base for many years.
Following the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021, American presence in the region diminished, along with close ties to Pakistan. China, along with Russia and Iran, seized the opportunity to position itself politically and economically, while Pakistan tries to balance great power affiliations with its economic interests.
This balancing act is complicated by significant internal challenges in Pakistan. The country’s four provinces have always competed for political influence and economic priorities. The largest but least populous province, Balochistan, and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa feel marginalized compared to Sindh and Punjab.
In Balochistan, groups are demanding more influence and rights, with some advocating for full independence from Pakistan, and some resorting to military attacks. In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the Pakistani Taliban and the Islamic State Khorasan group (IS-K) are responsible for similar attacks. Over the past few years, Chinese-funded projects and institutions have been targeted for attacks, as they are seen as supporters of the Pakistani state.
This challenges China’s stance of neutrality.
Economic corridor and projects
The CPEC project is highlighted as the cornerstone of cooperation between China and Pakistan. The agreement, signed in 2015, was initially valued at $45.6 billion and later increased to $62 billion.
The project is divided into three phases over 15 years, combining various forms of loans with private Chinese investments. It includes far more than just a transportation network through Pakistan, with priorities given to energy supply, economic zones, technical education, and agricultural sector development.
The Gwadar port in Balochistan has received the most attention and is seen by some as an indicator that China may fail in its projects.
The project was initially a Pakistani initiative aimed at creating a militarily secure deep-sea port far from the Indian border. Work began in 2002, with the first phase completed in 2007. It was reprioritized in 2015 under Chinese management as part of the CPEC project.
Challenges
Data collection and interviews highlight three factors that have delayed the first phase of the CPEC project and raised concerns about the financing of the second phase from 2021 to 2025.
First, Pakistani politicians could not agree on a main road through Pakistan to Gwadar. Instead, they prioritized local road and transport projects that did not provide an optimal transportation solution from a Belt and Road Initiative perspective. Additionally, there were complaints about a lack of bidding processes for the projects and widespread corruption, reducing the value of Chinese investments for both recipients and investors.
Second, ongoing political turbulence in Pakistan and the country’s worsening economy have posed challenges. This not only affected the state’s ability to repay loans, but Chinese private investors, who had funded the highly prioritized electricity development, also complained about delayed payments, reducing their willingness to invest further.
Third, and an increasing challenge, is security. There have been several suicide attacks against Chinese projects, workers, and educational institutions.
The Difficult Neutrality
Local resistance in Balochistan to Chinese-supported projects and armed attacks challenges China’s stance of neutrality. They have urged the Taliban administration in Afghanistan to prevent the Pakistani Taliban from carrying out more attacks and have pressured Pakistan to improve protection for Chinese workers and projects.
This development fits into a broader international pattern, where China increasingly turns to diplomatic measures to address conflicts threatening its strategic and economic interests. The best example so far is China’s role in brokering a deal between arch-enemies Iran and Saudi Arabia in 2023.
Thus far, China has been cautious in publicly criticizing Pakistani authorities. Any criticism remains internal but is indirectly visible through delays or postponements of planned CPEC projects.
It will be interesting to observe how China responds moving forward, whether it will address local resistance and concerns about the exploitation of natural resources, and whether it will maintain its neutrality when its strategic and economic interests, along with the promised development and peace in recipient countries, come under direct threat.
- Arne Strand is a Senior Researcher at Chr. Michelsen Insitute, and a part of the PRIO-led project AsiaPeace.
- This text was published in Norwegian by Panorama 10 September 2024:
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