Russia’s ninth annual Eastern Economic Forum was held last week on September 3–6 in Vladivostok. It was intended to promote Moscow’s commitment to pivoting its economic policy toward the Asia-Pacific, but instead exposed the shortcomings of this ambition.
Putin at the Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok, September 2024. Photo: kremlin.ru
The Kremlin is not only demanding the redeployment of all combat-capable Russian units to the battlefields in Donbas for its war in Ukraine, but also is forced to sustain political efforts on withstanding Russia’s confrontation with the West.
Relying on China
Russian President Vladimir Putin performed with his usual grandiloquence at the forum, asserting that economic growth in the Russian Far East was spectacular and that the combat operations in Ukraine were going according to plan (Izvestiya, September 5). Recent forecasts from the Russian Central Bank present a more sober picture. Growth is barely registered, mainly on account of the accumulating stresses in Russia’s economy in the course of the long war (Forbes.ru, September 2; The Moscow Times, September 5). The tumultuous effect of Russia’s war in Ukraine on its economy is affecting Moscow’s relations with partners, especially China, which Russia is increasingly relying on as it combats Western sanctions and international ostracism (see EDM, January 22, May 6 [1], [2], September 5).
China-Africa Cooperation
China is meant to be the main focus of the Russian pivot. The timing of the Vladivostok forum, however, did not demonstrate this priority, as it coincided with the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, in which Chinese President Xi Jinping invested a lot of personal effort (Vedomosti, September 5). Chinese Vice President Han Zheng graced the Russian event with his presence. Han was formerly a politburo standing committee member, one of the most powerful positions in the Chinese Communist Party. Since stepping down from that role in 2022, however, the role he has assumed as Vice President is purely ceremonial. The only memorable moment of his meeting with Putin was a failure of his translation equipment (Kommersant, September 4). This signals that stagnation rather than expansion is the trend in Russia-China economic interactions, and the pronounced reluctance of Chinese banks to risk punishment from US sanctions is causing tremors in the Russian financial system (The Moscow Times, September 4). Chinese companies are resolutely reluctant to invest in Russia, even in projects with attractive profit margins, such as coal mines (RBC, August 5).
Putin’s long-cherished project for a pipeline to China from the Yamal gas fields — which are presently cut off from the traditional market in Europe — remains buried in a pile of memoranda of understanding (The Moscow Times, August 5). This project was profiled during Putin’s visit to Mongolia on September 3 prior to his arrival in Vladivostok, but the pompous ceremony in Ulaanbaatar was mostly camouflage for the meager outcomes of the superficially cordial talks (Kommersant, September 3). The main goal of Putin’s visit was to create a precedent of ignoring the warrant of the International Criminal Court (ICC), which seeks to put the commander in chief of Russian aggression behind bars and expected full cooperation from Mongolia, an ICC member state (Novaya Gazeta Europe, September 3; NV.ua, September 2). The flowery compliments from Anwar Ibrahim, Prime Minister of Malaysia, the guest of honor at the Vladivostok forum’s plenary session, were further music to Putin’s ears (Kommersant, September 5). The list of prominent speakers had, however, no other entries.
The Kursk incursion
The Kursk incursion — the latest twist in the trajectory of the war in Ukraine — has aggravated the uncertainty that confused the proceedings of Putin’s two previous fora. Putin tried his best to exude confidence, but reassurances can only work to an extent when foreign troops have been occupying a part of Russia’s territory for a month and show no intention of withdrawing (see EDM, August 15, September 3). In a departure from his previously indifferent rhetoric, Putin declared the expulsion of Ukrainian troops from the Kursk region to be a “sacred duty” of the Russian army — a duty that it is apparently in no rush to perform (Republic.ru, September 5). Russian reinforcements continue to trickle into the territory, but the Ukrainian brigades prefer to search for Russian forces’ weak points rather than push forward, so the combat situation remains fluid (The Insider, August 29). Political benefits for Kyiv from this daring offensive are greater than the strategic gains, and the advantage of keeping its options open may not last long. At the same time, the possibility of Ukrainian troops eventually being forced out of Kursk entails serious risks (Svoboda.org, September 6).
Putin has opted to ignore the damage the Ukrainian attack has done to Russian soil and sustain the offensive push in Donbas, primarily in the Pokrovsk direction (Meduza, September 7). Most of the attendees at the Vladivostok forum, as well as the no-shows, have no opinion on whether a square mile gained by Russian troops in Donbas is worth ten square miles lost in Kursk oblast. Still, they are likely aware that Russia’s power projection capabilities in the vast Asia-Pacific region have shrunk dramatically since the beginning of the war. Seeking to dispel that impression, Putin found it opportune to visit the 155th Marine Brigade’s base in Vladivostok and praised its performance in combat (Izvestiya, August 4). The brigade, however, has become notorious for suffering heavy casualties caused by the arrogant incompetence of its command (Current Time, December 18, 2023).
The security stakeholders in the Asia-Pacific have noted that the Ukrainian offensive into Kursk oblast has not triggered a surge in Russian nuclear brinkmanship or a revision in Russian nuclear doctrine (Forbes.ru, September 1). Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov sternly advised the media not to make jokes about Russia’s “red lines,” but even the “patriotic” commentators are appalled about the exposed enervation of nuclear deterrence (RBC, September 4; TopWar.ru, September 5). The main reason for Putin’s uncharacteristic nuclear timidity and the pensive silence in the group of nuclear “hawks” in Moscow is the pronounced disapproval of the escalatory rhetoric by China (Valdai Club, September 4). Beijing is promoting a draft treaty on the no-first-use of nuclear weapons, and Moscow is compelled to express readiness to contribute positively to this initiative (Interfax, August 27).
Orchestrated optimism
The orchestrated optimism of the Vladivostok forum cannot hide the fact that only an end to the war in Ukraine could make it possible for Russia to begin rebuilding its eroded position and influence in the Asia-Pacific.
At the forum, Putin felt obliged to re-confirm his openness to peace talks, which for him means discussing conditions of Ukraine’s surrender, and only after Kyiv’s troops have retreated from Kursk oblast. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy made a risky choice when launching the offensive. Still, he succeeded in exposing the falsity of Putin’s posturing of holding the position of strength and controlling the strategic initiative. Now, Zelenskyy needs to convert this success into progress on two crucial tracks: ensuring sustained support from the West and convincing doubters in the Asia-Pacific, including China, that his peace plan is a practical proposition and not just a maneuver of information warfare. It is a tall order to deliver a follow-up to the August surprise, but Ukraine has remarkable reserves of resilience.
- Pavel K Baev is a Research Professor at PRIO
- This text is also published by Eurasia Daily Monitor