Putin’s Much Ado About the BRICS Summit

Vladimir Putin at a press conference at the 16th BRICS Summit in Kazan, Russia in October 2024. Photo: Sefa Karacan/Anadolu via Getty Images

The bloc was initially comprised of four members in 2009, including Brazil, Russia, India, and China; it expanded to five in 2011 when South Africa joined, and to the present nine with Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates acceding in 2023, with several applications pending. While the annual gathering itself was not insignificant, it can hardly compare to the decision-oriented workings of the Group of Seven’s (G7) leading democracies, a group that admitted Russia in 1998 and expelled it in 2014 (The Insider, October 22). Regardless of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s efforts to position himself as a champion fighting against Western oppression, his aggression against Ukraine taints his posturing.

New members – complications

The main achievement of the summit, as trumpeted by Moscow commentators, was the demonstration that Russia is not and cannot be isolated in the international arena (Meduza, October 24). The recent additions serve this purpose, and while registering new members has become the focus, it has not been without complications (Carnegie Politika, October 25).

Among other major regional powers, Indonesia and Saudi Arabia postponed their decisions on joining BRICS, Argentina declined the invitation, and Nigeria was never invited. Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva found a medical reason to skip the summit, Serbian President Aleksandr Vučić had more demanding engagements in his schedule, and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who was invited as a guest of honor, was distracted during his long-postponed bilateral conversation with Putin by a terrorist attack in Ankara (Rossiiskaya gazeta, October 23; Republic.ru, October 25).

The anti-Western character of BRICS

These minor setbacks added to the major failure of Putin’s message to emphasize the anti-Western character of BRICS (see EDM, October 21; The Moscow Times, October 26). While China is often inclined to exploit anti-American discourse, India is opposed to it, and new members such as Egypt and the United Arab Emirates prefer a more balanced and less confrontational stance (Novaya gazeta Europe, October 24). For many weeks, Russian propaganda painted the forthcoming summit as a culmination of resentment in the “world majority” against the Western neo-colonial dominance, but expert examinations of the final declaration approved in Kazan cannot point to any signs of this imagined rebellion (see EDM, October 21; RIAC, October 25). Moscow pundits are now reduced to arguing that the diversity of opinions and aspirations among the BRICS member-states and potential invitees is a sign of the group’s strength rather than incoherence (Rossiiskaya gazeta, October 25; Izvestiya, October 26).

A new payment system

Moscow’s practical proposal for the Kazan summit was to establish a new payment system called “BRICS Bridge” independent of Western-controlled financial institutions (Forbes.ru, October 23; Re: Russia, October 26). Many emerging economies are hurt by the dependency on transactions denominated in US dollars, and China is eager to increase the circulation of its own currency for trade payments. Despite this, not one major economic actor among those gathered in Kazan was prepared to declare that they were adopting a new alternative to the SWIFT system, an international payment service, from which Russia has been cut off since the start of its aggression against Ukraine (Novaya gazeta Europe, October 26). Moscow’s desire to open new channels of circumventing Western sanctions is transparent, and the declaration expressed a mild disapproval of said punishment. Every BRICS state, however, is firmly set on securing its own economic interests first and foremost (Nezavisimaya gazeta, October 24). Russian appeals to move away from the US dollar are undercut by the apparent weakness of its financial system, illustrated by its Central Bank’s decision to raise the interest rate again to a record-high 21 percent (RBC, October 26).

The security profile of BRICS

Moscow is also keen to strengthen the security profile of BRICS, but this ambition likewise sinks into a quagmire of diverging interests (RIAC, October 23). Nowhere was this discord more apparent than in the Middle East, as each high-profile speaker at the Kazan summit felt obliged to expostulate the situation at length, but the final declaration merely expressed concern in a carefully neutral way (TASS, October 23). Iran sought and failed to insert much stronger wording, and President Masoud Pezeshkian found little, if any, solidarity regarding the Israeli air strike delivered right after his return from Kazan (Izvestiya, October 26). Although the Russian Foreign Ministry issued a statement of concern about the “spiral of uncontrollable escalation,” a previously announced treaty on strategic partnership between Russia and Iran did not get signed (RBC, October 26; RAPSI, October 23).

Downplay the war in Ukraine

Meanwhile, Moscow was resolved to downplay its war in Ukraine, and the declaration gives it the briefest possible mention (The Moscow Times, October 23). Kyiv refrained from attempting another spectacular drone strike on an arsenal or an oil refinery in Russia, and Putin interpreted this choice not to upset his big event as evidence of an acknowledgment in the West of his warning against granting Ukraine permission for strikes on Russian territory with long-range missiles like SCALP/Storm Shadow (RIA Novosti, October 27). The developing story, casting a shadow over the pompous proceedings at the summit, is Russia’s “import” of thousands of soldiers from North Korea. Putin opted not to deny the arrival of North Korean troops into Russian forces, disconcerting China and upsetting even his closest ally Alyaksandr Lukashenka, the dictator of Belarus, who frequently dances to Putin’s tune (Svoboda.org, October 24; NV.ua, October 23).

The BRICS grouping being unable to address the most demanding security crises and economic challenges in a meaningful way is hardly a surprise. The more states from Africa, Latin America, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East that gather around the negotiating table — set this time by Russia — the greater the scope of differences present, preventing any joint stance.

Multi-polarity, about which Moscow is so eager to expound, is a major feature of interactions in the Global South — in contrast with the unity of purpose in the West. This unity can never be taken for granted, but Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, which brings concern and confusion to many around the globe, has prompted the West to reform a coalition that stands for upholding the foundations of the world order. This new solidarity is and will be constantly tested in the course of the long war, but Ukraine’s resilience and courage keep generating the centripetal momentum.

• Pavel K Baev is a Research Professor at PRIO
• This text is also published by Eurasia Daily Monitor