The Kremlin had confidently expected confusion and turmoil following the US presidential election.
Instead, a definite outcome and the commitment to a smooth transition of power are set to shape the US political environment for the next couple of months.
Trump and Putin meet in Helsinki in 2018. Photo: Chris McGrath/Getty Images
The significant majority of Russians preferred Donald Trump as the next US president, and among the Russian oligarchs, new hopes for an “unfreezing” of assets are blossoming (Re: Russia, November 5; Forbes.ru, November 8).
Russian President Vladimir Putin had also anticipated a change in US leadership and dropped hints about supporting a Harris administration to influence voters, playing his usual game of pretense and misinformation (Interfax, September 7). Putin now, however, has to deal with a strong political mandate for the president, who has gained challenging political experience since their July 2018 meeting in Helsinki, Finland, and will face few constraints in this administration’s policy-making (Carnegie Politika, November 7).
Putin’s attention is solely focused on the invasion of Ukraine
The annual meeting of the Valdai Club last week granted Putin an opportunity to congratulate President-elect Donald Trump on his victory, signaling readiness for a conversation and expressing admiration for his courage (Kommersant, November 7). The rambling late evening performance did not appear to be the “event of the year,” despite official instructions for mainstream Russia media to hail it as a philosophic elaboration on the doctrine of a new world order (Meduza, November 8). Putin’s speech covered numerous topics and demonstrated how he has only a vague understanding of artificial intelligence, which is hardly a state secret. Additionally, it was obvious that except for a peculiar interest in the issue of transgender athletes in the Olympic games, his attention is solely focused on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine (Kommersant, November 8).
Informing on the new spectacular successes of Russian groupings in both Kursk oblast and Donbas (where heavy casualties accompany every minor advance), Putin confirmed his readiness to talk about ending the war on his maximalist terms (The Insider, November 8; Meduza, November 9). His tendency to describe the confrontation with the West, centered on Ukraine, in terms of Russia’s global “mission,” leaves little space for constructive conversations (Republic.ru, November 7).
European worries amplified by Moscow
On the same day, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky presented his vision for ending the war at the summit of the European Political Community in Budapest, Hungary (Izvestiya, November 7). Worries among European leaders about the integrity of the coalition supporting Ukraine and the probable erosion of the Trans-Atlantic ties are eagerly amplified by Moscow pundits (RIAC, November 7). Europe’s certainty in increasing the scope of defense aid to Ukraine is mixed with uncertainty about President-elect Trump’s intentions regarding curtailing US contributions (NV.ua; Novaya Gazeta Europe, November 8).
Ending the war in Ukraine
Ideas on ending Russia’s war in Ukraine are gaining traction in Europe, but they clash with concerns about the costs of a “bad peace”that might require greater military investments in containing assertive Russia than the minimum required by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (Nezavisimaya gazeta, November 7). Putin announced interest in discussing Trump’s plans for ending the war in Ukraine but rejected any possibility of meaningful compromises, going against the desires of Russian elites who wish for an end to their war (The Moscow Times, November 7). Besides this domestic discontent, Putin should be worried about the irascible US leader’s response to demands that any possible deal must recognize and affirm Russia’s victory (Carnegie Politika, November 6; Riddle, November 7).
Trump’s contempt for NATO and the EU
Strategic hopes in Moscow are pinned on Trump’s well-known contempt for NATO and the European Union. Alongside this is his conviction that China is the main geopolitical competitor, which needs to be deterred by the maximum concentration of US resources and political will (Nezavisimaya gazeta, November 7). Russian experts expect that Trump’s antagonism would increase Moscow’s value for Beijing as the key strategic partner and stimulate Beijing’s readiness to provide supplies to the Russian war machine (RIAC, November 6). The Kremlin, however, is unsure how to respond to China’s persistent “advice” about how to end the war, which could potentially lead to a demand for reaching a ceasefire and proceeding with peace talks.
Presently, China is displeased by the deployment of North Korean troops to the Kursk war zone, resulting in Putin’s recent meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping during the BRICS (a loose political-economic grouping originally consisting of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) summit in Kazan being rather formal (Svoboda.org, October 22; see EDM, October 28). To Zelenskyy’s disappointment, the response from the United States and NATO to this provocative escalation has been limited to warnings and protestations. China might note Trump’s apparent disinterest in attempting to cut North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un down to size (Nezavisimaya gazeta, November 6; UNIAN, November 7).
The Middle East
The region where a surge of US engagement is widely expected is the Middle East, and Russian positions are set to suffer from Trump administration initiatives (Meduza, November 9).
Moscow has curtailed its ties with Israel, which will receive firm support from the United States for completing the operation in Gaza on its terms and for projecting power into Lebanon and Syria (RIAC, October 28; The Insider, November 7). Iran is sure to come under pressure, and it is noteworthy that the treaty on strategic partnership between Russia and Iran, which Putin approved by his decree back in mid-September, is still not signed (see EDM, September 18, November 4; TASS, October 11). Russia usually expects a bonus from a spike of tensions in the Middle East in the form of higher oil prices, but the shifts in US energy policy promised by Trump will drive these prices down (Rossiiskaya gazeta, November 10).
Moscow hopes
The hopes in Moscow produced by the ultimate defeat of the Harris campaign are likely doomed to disappear after its first encounters with the new policy decisions of new US leadership, quite probably without delay.
Russian ambitions for leading the presumed struggle of the “Global Majority,” a concept that lumps together states with starkly dissimilar interests and aspirations to justify Moscow’s aggressive actions, are sure to experience a sequence of hard landings starting next week at the Group of 20 (G20) summit in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil (see EDM, January 8, October 21).
What matters most for Putin is undoubtedly the change of US guidelines for his protracted and ever-evolving war in Ukraine. His victory plan based on the premise of crumbling Western unity in the long war of attrition is set to be tested by Trump’s aversion to financially aiding this war and desire to bring it to an end. Putin’s inability to make meaningful compromises could expose him to risks he is not prepared to face.
- Pavel K Baev is a Research Professor at PRIO
- This text is also published by Eurasia Daily Monitor