U.S., European, and Ukrainian peace-making policies are now aligned at a possible breakthrough point, as differences in means and methods transmute into complementarities. This fast evolution starkly contrasts with the immobility of Russia’s position.
Vladimir Putin in March 2025. Photo: Contributor/Getty Images
This resolve, so long as it exists, prohibits any discussion of possible compromises for peace (see Strategic Snapshot, February 24).
“We will not give up what is ours”
Russian President Vladimir Putin declares readiness to end the war, but uses every occasion to assert that no concessions are under consideration. Putin’s most recent effort at this was when meeting with women of the foundation, “Defenders of the Fatherland.” During the meeting, Putin claimed, “We do not need what is not ours, but we will not give up what is ours. We need an option that ensures the stable development of our country in terms of peace and security” (Kremlin.ru; Meduza, March 6).
This insistence on a peace arrangement that would fully conform with Russia’s interests, and essentially amount to a victory, clashes with U.S. President Donald Trump’s stance on the peace deal (RBC, March 2). In this case, all parties would leave somewhat dissatisfied. Trump’s promise to help Ukraine regain as much territory as possible is particularly disagreeable for Moscow. Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov pre-emptively ruled out any discussion on territorial concessions (Kommersant, February 17; Vedomosti, February 27). To make the demand for full control over four Ukrainian regions annexed in September 2022 more plausible, Moscow has redoubled its military efforts aimed at expelling Ukrainian troops from Kursk oblast (The Insider, March 7). The casualties are devastating, but the Kremlin is firmly set on denying Ukraine the trump card of holding Russian territory during the bargaining on an armistice (Re: Russia, March 4).
Leaves all the “root causes” of the war unaddressed
The proposition for a ceasefire remains a non-starter for Moscow in the negotiations, because it leaves all the “root causes” of the war unaddressed and allows Ukraine to become a “steel porcupine,” instead of compelling it to de-militarize (Nezavisimaya gazeta, March 3). Even the very limited French initiative on mutual restraint from long-distance missile and drone attacks was not only rejected by Moscow, but undercut by a massive Russian strike on Ukrainian energy infrastructure on March 7 (RBC, March 7). The Kremlin suspects that after making the ceasefire deal, Trump may lose interest in further talks. The much anticipated high-level dialogue would slacken, particularly since the problems of nuclear arms control have no easy solutions (Carnegie Politika, February 28; Interfax, March 6).
This refusal makes it necessary for Trump to reiterate the threat to tighten financial sanctions and tariffs against Russia (BFM.ru, March 7). Putin may be inclined to shrug off this pressure, but among the Russian business elite, the excitement about possible relaxation of sanctions is now mixed with anxiety (RIAC, March 7). Personal sanctions in particular cause much consternation. Many companies, however, have begun making plans for joint projects with U.S. investors, particularly in exploring the natural riches of the Arctic (Forbes.ru, March 4). This glimmer of hope is crucial for lifting the gloom prevalent among the entrepreneurs who are better informed about the accumulating problems in the Russian economy than Putin, who radiates confidence misinformed by the carefully doctored data (The Moscow Times, March 6). Russia’s full-scale invasion has certainly hit Ukraine excruciatingly hard, but Russia is affected profoundly as well and can sustain it for much longer (The Insider, March 6).
Security guarantees to Ukraine
Another block on the road to peace that Russia refuses to remove is security guarantees to Ukraine. Trump has asserted that security guarantees are the “easy part” after fighting ends (TASS, March 7). NATO, therefore, would not provide such guarantees without U.S. agreement. European states have therefore agreed to assume responsibility for it. Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni has suggested granting Ukraine reassurances similar to Article 5 of the NATO Charter, without bringing it into the Alliance (TopWar.ru, March 7). Keir Starmer, the U.K. Prime Minister, has taken the lead in building a coalition of the willing for deploying a combat-capable peacekeeping force that would constitute a material part of security guarantees (Novaya gazeta Europe, March 6). Moscow is adamant against any such deployment, and Lavrov has declared that there is “no space for compromise” on this matter (Kommersant, March 6).
Russia has been taken by surprise with the fast building resolve in Europe to redouble the collective efforts at strengthening regional security and to invest the necessary resources in modernizing the defense-industrial base (Kommersant, March 5). The EU summit last week established ambitious guidelines for these efforts. While some Moscow commentators appraise the deepening divide between Europe and the United States, others focus on the challenge to Russia from the rearmed Europe (TopWar.ru, March 7; Izvestiya, March 8). European determination to address the long-neglected security problems is typically belittled, and French President Emmanuel Macron is often singled out for sarcastic disparaging (RIAC, March 6).
Putin in an awkward position with China
The new Russian course on confrontation with Europe contravenes Beijing’s attempts to build bridges with the European Union and coordinate responses to the U.S.-initiated trade wars (Republic.ru, March 8). The Kremlin has long cherished hopes for an escalation of the pivotal geopolitical conflict between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the United States, expecting to gain more value from the strategic partnership with Beijing (Nezavisimaya gazeta, March 5). The fast progressing rapprochement with Trump has, however, put Putin into an awkward position of cancelling the habitual stance of denouncing the U.S. “hegemony,” which used to be his main point of agreement with PRC President Xi Jinping (Profile, March 5). This turnaround is registered in Beijing, encouraging the European Union to take the lead in negotiating the arrangements to end Russia’s war against Ukraine (Svoboda.org, March 6).
Ceasefire is not peace
Moscow probably is accepting an even greater risk by frustrating the desire in Washington D.C. for a swift closure of the senseless war. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has emphasized his commitment to peace, and his team of negotiators now have an opportunity in the meeting with U.S. counterparts in Riyadh this week to clarify that a ceasefire is not a peace, but merely a pause. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has become key to ensuring the durability of Putin’s regime, despite the Russian population’s lack of enthusiasm and growing weariness toward the war(see EDM, September 10, 2024).
Moscow’s new rapprochement with Trump is neither sincere nor sufficient for ensuring a benevolent U.S. attitude as material concessions remain incompatible with Putin’s urge to prove Russia’s right to dominate over its neighbors. A ceasefire would constitute proof of the senselessness of Putin’s war and leave him with the burden of consequences of his blunder.
- Pavel K Baev is a Research Professor at PRIO
- This text is also published by Eurasia Daily Monitor