Triumphalism in Moscow About Setback in Peace-Making for Ukraine Could be Short-Lived

President Donald Trump (C) and Vice President JD Vance meet with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in the Oval Office at the White House on February 28, 2025 . Photo: Andrew Harnik/Getty Images

Zelenskyy’s point, “I am not here to play cards,” echoes the same conviction as when he famously refused to escape from Kyiv when threatened by Russian tanks, claiming  “I need ammunition, not a ride” (X/@UkrEmbLondon, February 26, 2022; Novaya Gazeta Europe, March 1).

Ukrainian victory in Russia’s war against the country remains out of reach, and in the latest Russian opinion polls, less than a third of respondents express resolve for continuing combat operations. Support for making concessions in order to sign a prospective peace agreement has, however, barely reached 30 percent (Levada.ru, February 28). This creates little if any incentive for Russian President Vladimir Putin to indicate readiness to make steps toward a compromise.

Russian politicians falling into euphoria

In an interview on March 2, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov explained that “during Donald Trump’s first election, many of our politicians fell into euphoria. Now they are falling into it again” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, March 2). This euphoria is due to what Lavrov characterized as the U.S. administration’s pragmatism and common sense in its approach to relations with Russia.

The Kremlin was likely worried about the flurry of diplomatic activity in Washington D.C. last week, while its own consultations about normalizing relations and appointing a new ambassador to United States were progressing slowly (Vedomosti, February 28). The quarrel in the White House last Friday, however, has been presented by the Russian state and in media narratives as “[u]nprecedented in the history of international politics and diplomacy” and evidence of Ukraine being in the wrong (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, March 1).

The Kremlin considers the exchange as reassurance that Zelenskyy is “obsessed with continuing the war and rejects peace” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, March 1). It has, in Moscow’s mind, confirmed that Zelenskyy is “the most dangerous threat to the international community,” he has “lost his grip on reality and is unable to reach and honor agreements” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, March 1). Kirill Dmitriev, Putin’s newly-promoted negotiator, described the discord as “historic” (RBC, February 28).

Russian state media have published a full transcript of the exchange, characterized as an “open squabble,” between Zelenskyy, Trump, and U.S. Vice President JD Vance (Izvestiya, March 1). Moscow pundits have been eager to overdo one another with sarcastic assessments of Zelenskyy’s political blunders and awkward English (Kommersant, February 28). They emphasize U.S. official statements that Zelenskyy was put in his place and how Zelenskyy “rushed” out of the Oval Office after “Trump personally ordered Zelenskyy to leave the White House and the United States” (TASS; Ekspert, March 1).

The agreement on Ukraine’s mineral resources

Zelenskyy’s readiness to engage in talks at the White House reflected his commitment to sign the agreement on U.S. privileged access to Ukraine’s mineral resources, including rare earth elements, that had been negotiated despite many technical issues and emotional reactions (Carnegie Politika, February 27). Moscow had been monitoring the bargaining with much concern assuming that the deal might include deposits on the Ukrainian territories annexed by Russia (NV.ua, February 28).

Putin even tried to counter this agreement by inviting the United States to invest in development of Russian mineral resources, including aluminum (The Moscow Times, February 27). Russia is rich in many minerals, including rare earth elements, but many discoveries from the Soviet era, for instance lithium deposits, are underexplored, and the investment climate remains forbidding (Forbes.ru, February 26; Nezavisimaya gazeta, February 27). Offers made by Dmitriev to his U.S. counterparts were far from exciting, but the Ukrainian projects are also a long way from becoming profitable. The disappointing cost-benefit calculations may have dissuaded Washington from presenting the agreed document as a major success (Re: Russia, February 28).

A ceasefire became the key issue

Instead of the minerals deal, the demand for a ceasefire became the key issue. For Ukraine, the central question is security guarantees, because Zelenskyy cannot trust Putin’s goodwill (see Strategic Snapshot, February 24). For Russia, an armistice leaves the root causes of the existential conflict unaddressed, while the war is, in Putin’s words, “God’s will” (Rossiiskaya gazeta, February 23). Zelenskyy did not deny the problems that Ukraine is facing while defending against Russia’s invasion, yet the same cannot be said for Putin who continues to pretend that miniscule advances by Russian forces do not yield tremendous costs (The Insider, February 24). The attrition of the “big battalions” of the Russian Army can no longer be compensated by recruitment offers with mind-boggling bonuses to “volunteers,” which in turn would delay any further mobilization efforts by many months (The Moscow Times, February 28).

European emergency summits

As European leaders convene an emergency summit with Zelenskyy in London for a “once in a generation moment,” Putin’s position is evaluated quite differently than in Washington (Nezavisimaya gazeta, March 1; The Kyiv Independent, March 2). The summit has alarmed many Russian “patriotic” commentators (TopWar.ru, February 26; Meduza, March 1). This position of collective strength has not been the only show of support for Zelenskyy by European leaders, who gathered at an emergency summit in Paris last Monday on the sidelines of U.S.-Russia talks in Saudi Arabia (Kyiv Independent, February 18). These summits reflect the fast emerging determination in Europe to invest greater resources in building own defense base and in keeping Ukraine in the fight, while leaving Russia to face an overwhelming coalition in its immediate and most important neighborhood (Izvestiya, February 28).

Rhetorical maneuvering by the Kremlin

These developments have required tactical rhetorical maneuvering by the Kremlin as it has in prior years dedicated great effort to constructing a worldview in which the intrinsically hostile United States leads a grouping of obedient vassals in confrontation with Russia (Svoboda.org, March 2). This narrative is shifting as the rapprochement between Putin and Trump undercut such simplistic geopolitics. Experts in Moscow have ventured opinions about the need to modify the political discourse, but in fact, it is the whole political philosophy of breaking the U.S. world “hegemony” that needs change (RIAC, February 26). Putin attempted to explain his maneuvering addressing the expanded gathering of the Federal Security Service (FSB) Collegium, but the usefulness of embracing the arch-enemy was far from obvious for this loyal audience of the most powerful of Russian special services (Kommersant, February 27).

Splitting the trans-Atlantic unity

Splitting the trans-Atlantic unity and driving the United States away from Europe has been a long-set goal in Russia’s strategy, and its full-scale invasion of Ukraine is used as a lever for achieving this goal.

The Kremlin, however, may be overcalculating the benefits of last Friday’s meeting in the White House to Moscow’s narratives. It is convenient to dismiss Europe as a disunion with no security agency, but a different reality is taking shape faster than Moscow expects. This emerging Europe is vested in ensuring peace for Ukraine, and it is up to European leaders to demonstrate that the real barrier to lasting peace is not Zelenskyy’s stubbornness, but Putin’s insatiable pursuit to see Ukraine defeated.

• Pavel K. Baev is a Research Professor at PRIO
• This text is also published by Eurasia Daily Monitor