On April 28, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced a three-day ceasefire in his war against Ukraine in the lead-up to the commemoration of the 80th anniversary of the Second World War (President of Russia, April 28).
Illustration: JStudios/Getty Images
The ceasefire is due to begin at midnight on May 7 and last until midnight on May 10. Even with this ceasefire, Russia’s official position on ending its war against Ukraine has hardly changed over time (see EDM, February 14, 2022, February 18).
Shift in tone and content
The tone and content of political discussions, however, curtailed as they are, have shifted as if a peace agreement is merely days away. Even Russian public opinion, which has long been in favor of an armistice, registers an uptick of optimistic mood and a decline of fears (Levada, April 25). The positive expectations might prove to be just spring illusions, as Russian President Vladimir Putin keeps trying to postpone difficult decisions, as is his wont, and minimize the political price of his choices.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov offered assurances after the visit of Steven Witkoff, U.S. President Donald Trump’s special envoy to the Kremlin, that some “elements” of the peace deal with Ukraine were yet to be worked out (Vedomosti, April 26). Lavrov does not specify what exactly these “elements” are or if he knows them himself. He was clearly irked by the lack of proper diplomatic work on the agreement, negotiated in a rush between Witkoff and Putin’s new favorite negotiator, Kirill Dmitriev (Carnegie Politika, April 24). Moscow insists on keeping the proceedings secret, but Western media leaks and Trump’s social media posts offer some insights into what has been discussed thus far (Izvestiya, April 26).
The status of Crimea
In the center of these discussions is the status of Crimea, which Russia annexed in 2014 (TIME; Kommersant, April 25). Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has refused to trade off any Ukrainian territory (Interfax.ua, April 25).
Zelenskyy’s statement was followed by the decision of Witkoff and U.S. State Secretary Marco Rubio not to partake in high-level talks in London last week, planned as a follow-up to the meeting in Paris a week prior (President of Ukraine; Gazeta.ru, April 23).
Russian pundits’ gloating about the alleged diplomatic fiasco cannot cancel the fact that the London meeting did happen, even if on a lower level, and has produced a plan complementary to the U.S. proposal, while ruling out any formal recognition of territorial gains of Russian aggression (Novaya Gazeta Europe, April 25). This plan is not mentioned in mainstream Russian media as experts try to outdo one another with scorn aimed at European hostility and war-mongering (Valdai club, April 21; Rossiiskaya gazeta, April 23). “Patriotic” bloggers allege that the European plan amounts to a demand for Russia’s capitulation (Topcor.ru, April 25).
Withdrawal of Russian troops
Editorial commentary has focused its attention on how the points proposed by the United States are seen as unacceptable for Russia and could have been inserted for deletion in further bargaining (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, April 23).
One such point is the withdrawal of Russian troops from the undisputedly Ukrainian territories, such as Kharkiv oblast, as well as from the Kinburn Spit, which controls the waterway to the port of Mykolaiv (Meduza, April 25). Russian forces have concentrated their attacks into Sumy oblast, where Putin aims to establish a “security zone” preventing possible new incursions into Kursk oblast (The Insider; Kommersant, April 26). Particular deprecation is aimed at the proposal to withdraw Russian troops from the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, where reactors may be restarted under U.S. control, which is condemned as incompatible with Russia’s interests (TopWar.ru, April 25).
Freezing combat operations
Russia’s semi-official hints at readiness to freeze combat operations along the present lines of battles, rather than any level of retreat, distract attention from the fact that Moscow has written off a month-long ceasefire, as suggested by the United States and formerly in the European plan (Svoboda, April 23). Putin’s initiative on the 30-hour Easter truce, which even some insightful Moscow experts mistook for the beginning of a de-escalation of the deadlocked fighting, helped him to cover up this rejection (RIAC, April 21).
Russian missile and drone attacks have resumed with added brutality, including the massive strike on Kyiv, to which Trump threatened new sanctions against Russia (RBC, April 24; Meduza, April 26). In response to the attacks, Ukrainian forces hit Russia’s ammunition depot arsenal in Kirzhach, to the east of Moscow (UNN, April 22). Russian military command attributes the explosions at the depot to a technical accident, while the locals believe in a drone attack (Kommersant, April 25).
The Kremlin appears unnerved
Putin’s determination to continue the war until Ukraine surrenders and Western solidarity expires is well documented and translated into plans that allocate all the necessary resources to keep the Russian war machine going (Re: Russia, April 11). The contraction of revenues from oil and gas exports places Russia’s budget under heavy stress, although the funding of arms production and recruitment can be sustained (The Moscow Times, April 24). The Kremlin nevertheless appears unnerved by Washington’s threat to discontinue the peace-making efforts.
The meeting between Trump and Zelenskyy in Rome has apparently added to this nervousness (Forbes.ru, April 21; RBC, April 27). Putin’s expressed readiness to engage in direct talks with Ukraine without preconditions contrasts with Russia’s continuing missile attacks. Putin needs to find a way to convince Washington that his promises to contribute to the peace deal amount to “tapping … along” (RIA Novosti, April 26).
The problem for Putin is not that Trump could walk away from the deadlocked talks and hold him, rather than Zelenskyy, responsible for the failure. His problem is that engagement with the United States is perceived as the main proof of Russia’s superior international status. The Kremlin tries to create an agenda for this engagement that would bracket out Ukraine and include attractive advantages, from offshore joint ventures in the Arctic to strategic arms control. Real profits and political gains in this agenda are dubious, and the war against Ukraine is looming large.
Putin’s desires for Ukraine go far beyond any temporary ceasefire or peace deal offers, and the compromise settlement he is compelled to accept amounts to an admission of the blunder of starting the unwinnable war.
- Pavel K Baev is a Research Professor at PRIO
- This text is also published by Eurasia Daily Monitor